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Abstract 
In the absence of well-established factor markets, the role of indigenous institutions and social 
networks can be substantial for mobilizing factors for agricultural production. We investigate the role 
of an indigenous social network in Ethiopia, the iddir, in facilitating factor market transactions among 
smallholder farmers. Using detailed longitudinal household survey data and employing a difference-in-
differences approach, we find that iddir membership improves households’ access to factor markets. 
Specifically, we find that joining an iddir network improves households’ access to land, labor and 
credit transactions between 7 and 11 percentage points. Furthermore, our findings also indicate that 
iddir networks crowd-out borrowing from local moneylenders (locally referred as Arata Abedari), a 
relatively expensive credit source, virtually without affecting borrowing from formal credit sources. 
These results point out the roles non-market arrangements, such as social networks, can play in 
mitigating market inefficiencies in poor rural markets.  
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1. Introduction 
Markets in developing countries are characterized by a broad range of failures that adversely affect the 
individual actors and challenge the institutions created to mediate their interactions in the marketplace 
(Stiglitz, 1989; Besley, 1994). Factor markets, like several other markets in developing countries, are 
subject to widespread inefficiencies resulting from incomplete information and imperfect contract 
enforcement, exacerbated by unclear property rights and subsequent high transaction costs (Stiglitz and 
Weis, 1981; Collier, 1983; Stiglitz, 1989; Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990; de Janvry et al., 1991; Barrett and 
Mutambatsere, 2008; Pender and Fafchamps, 2006). 
Nowhere are these problems more critical than in land, labor, and rural credit markets of 
developing countries. These three types of markets are particularly thin and inhibited by problems of 
information asymmetry. As a result, moral hazard, adverse selection, and related opportunistic 
behaviors are common, since transactions in these markets require extensive information for screening, 
monitoring, and contract enforcement. Information asymmetry in these markets results in transaction 
costs that are high, as monitoring and penalizing opportunistic behavior is difficult. The failure of 
factor markets imply that “either the transactions simply do not occur, or substitute institutions emerge 
to allow the transaction to take place” (de Janvry et al., 1991). A vast amount of literature points to 
such failures in these markets giving rise to traditional institutional arrangements and social networks 
playing critical roles in filling the gaps in exchanges of goods, services, and factors of production that 
markets fail to deliver (Binswanger and McIntire, 1987; Rosenzweig, 1988; Udry, 1990). One line of 
literature studies the widespread use of land and labor sharing contracts in developing countries in the 
face of risk and missing insurance markets (e.g. Johnson, 1950; Cheung, 1969) and imperfect 
monitoring of labor efforts (e.g., Newbery, 1975). These studies point to incentives, risk pooling, and 
the production efficiency advantage of land and labor sharing arrangements. Pender and Fafchamps 
(2006) point out that social relationships – capitalizing on pre-existing trust and thereby reducing 
transaction costs of monitoring – play important roles in determining land and labor contract 
arrangements.  
A similar line of literature studies how information asymmetry undermines the operations and 
effectiveness of rural credit markets in developing countries. Empirical evidence, following the seminal 
work by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), points to such information asymmetry in rural credit markets 
limiting lenders from writing effective contracts because, in the absence of information regarding the 
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characteristics and activities of their clientele, formal lenders find it difficult to discern their potential 
borrower types in these areas (Udry, 1990; Aryeetey and Udry, 1997). In the absence of formal credit, 
households often rely on credit from their informal networks to smooth consumption (Fafchamps, 
2006; Rosenzweig, 1988; Townsend, 1995; Fafchamps and Lund, 1998). Informal credit often involves 
trust-based self-enforcing informal networks and relationships which are typically characterized by 
flexibility in credit allocation and repayment (Udry, 1990; Fafchamps, 2006). In most rural 
communities, these activities are organized in some form of traditional social networks that provide 
group-based informal insurance, like iddirs in Ethiopia. These institutions perform a crucial function 
for rural households in overcoming important market imperfections by expediting the flow of 
information within and beyond the village (Udry, 1990; Barr, 2000), reducing monitoring and 
enforcement costs (Sadoulet et al., 1997; Berhane et al., 2009; Fafchamps and Minten, 2002; Karlan, 
2007), and developing trust among agents (Fukuyama, 1995; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003).  
There is a large empirical literature on the formation, prevalence, and role of social networks 
in dealing with a wide spectrum of socio-economic problems, including risk and consumption 
smoothing (Udry, 1994; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Okten and Osili, 2004; Hoddinott et al., 2005; 
Hoddinott et al., 2009; Wydick et al., 2011; Ali and Deininger, 2014; Ali et al., 2014); credit, saving 
and transaction costs (Dercon et al., 2006; De Weerdt and Dercon, 2006); and technology adoption, 
insurance, and productivity (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Barr, 2000; Conley and Udry, 2002; Fafchamps 
and Lund, 2003; Fafchamps and Minten, 2002; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Krishnan and Sciubba, 
2009). However, little is known about the explicit roles of social networks in mitigating factor market 
imperfections, and, hence, their role in facilitating factor market transactions among smallholder 
farmers. 
In this paper, we study the role of an indigenous social network in Ethiopia, iddir associations, 
in overcoming factor market imperfections to facilitate factor transactions among smallholder farmers. 
Iddir is the most inclusive and widespread social network in Ethiopia, commonly established by 
community members, neighbors, or among friends and families. The origin of iddir as a social network 
is to provide funeral services and to support bereaved family members morally and financially (see for 
instance, Dercon et al., 2006). However, a closer look at iddir networks reveals their scope to go 
beyond funeral associations, as they are involved in many socio-economic issues (Pankhurst and 
Mariam, 2000; Mariam, 2003; Dercon et al., 2006). By offering informal social insurance, information, 
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and trust among members, iddir associations share the main micro-level properties of other networks 
(Caeyers and Dercon, 2012). However, very little is known about how iddir networks contribute to the 
economic activity of their members. Dercon et al. (2006; 2008) studied the role of iddir networks as 
funeral and insurance institutions, while Hoddinott et al. (2005) investigated the role of iddir networks 
as risk coping mechanisms. Investigating the roles of social networks in ameliorating market 
imperfections in the Ethiopian case provides an interesting context given the coexistence of such social 
networks and evidence of pervasive market failures and their associated high transaction costs in rural 
Ethiopia (Deininger et al., 2008; Deininger and Jin, 2008; Ghebru and Holden, 2008).  
We use longitudinal household survey data from Ethiopia to investigate the role of iddir 
networks in facilitating factor market transactions among farmers. To circumvent estimation and 
identification problems associated with households’ self-selection into network membership, we 
exploit the longitudinal feature of the data and use a difference-in-differences approach. We find that 
iddir membership improves household’s access to factor market transactions in a range of 7 to 11 
percentage points. Specifically, we find that iddir membership improves households’ sharecropping 
and labor-sharing practices, as well as their access to credit. Interestingly, our findings also indicate 
that iddir networks crowd-out borrowings from village moneylenders (locally referred to as Arata 
Abedari), who often provide expensive credit due to the screening, monitoring, and contract 
enforcement problems that can be removed by social networks. However, our findings suggest that 
membership in these networks does not crowd-out borrowing from formal credit sources that offer both 
relatively cheaper and larger amounts of credit. These results are robust to various empirical  
specifications and robustness checks. These substantial effects potentially work through households’ 
privileged access to key resources that iddir networks avail to their members ranging from enabling the 
flow of information among members and, thereby, building trust, up to penalizing opportunistic 
behavior through provisions of strict rules and social sanctions. The results of this analysis are 
important in at least two ways. First, while much of economics continues to rely on assumptions of 
market-based solutions to imperfections (Fafchamps, 2004:3-21), these results suggest that non-market 
institutions also can play crucial roles in intermediating transactions whenever contracts are not 
perfectly enforceable due to lack of information or efficient court systems. Second, they further suggest 
that the outcomes of government intervention to improve market performance in these contexts is not 
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straightforward. Care must be taken not to crowd-out the role these institutions are bound to play in 
facilitating local exchange (Dercon et al., 2006).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional features of 
iddir networks in Ethiopia. Section 3 presents a brief exposition of factor markets in Ethiopia, while 
Section 4 discusses the data and empirical models used for this analysis. In section 5, we present and 
discuss the empirical results, while Section 6 provides concluding remarks and policy implications. 
 
2. Institutional Features of Iddir Networks In Ethiopia 
Iddir is the most inclusive and widespread type of social network in Ethiopia, prevalent both in rural 
and urban settings and inclusive of gender, wealth, education, religion, and ethnicity (Pankhurst, 2008). 
Originally, iddir networks were established to provide financial (cash) and other types of support (in 
kind) when a family member dies. These networks also assume a key role in facilitating the burial and 
funeral of the deceased member. However, a close look at iddir networks reveals that they go beyond 
funeral associations as they are involved in many socio-economic issues. Iddirs provide small credit for 
their members, often without collateral (Dercon et al., 2006); help unemployed members (Pankhurst 
and Mariam 2000); finance their members’ health care expenditures (Mariam, 2003); provide financial 
assistance when their members suffer from other shocks (Dercon et al., 2006); and in recent years, iddir 
networks provide insurance for death of key livestock, such as oxen. 
Iddir networks often have well-defined and written rules (Dercon et al., 2006). Membership is 
on a voluntary basis and is commonly open to all members living in a village (Hoddinott et al., 2005; 
Dercon et al., 2006; Mariam, 2003).1 Hoddinott et al. (2005) and Mariam (2003) report that the 
majority of iddirs in Ethiopia have no restrictions on membership and that all villages in their study 
samples hosted at least one iddir that was open to anyone living in the village. Members are required to 
pay a monthly contribution, while new members may have to pay an entrance fee. Membership fees in 
most iddirs are relatively small and provide some flexibility in payment due dates, and hence, most 
interested potential members are able to join. Dercon et al. (2006) report that the average monthly 
household contribution to iddirs in their sample amounted to 1.64 Birr (0.08 USD), which is too small 
to dictate participation in these networks. In addition, most iddirs have flexible conditions for the 
1 See Pankhurst and Mariam (2000) for an exhaustive list of types of iddir associations in Ethiopia. 
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membership of the very poor, accepting non-monetary contributions and sometimes allowing people to 
become members free of charge (Pankhurst and Mariam, 2000; Mariam, 2003).  
Previous studies show that individual and household wealth indicators have insignificant 
effects on iddir membership. For example, Dercon et al. (2006) find that, while age and household size 
affects the probability of becoming a member, wealth, land, and livestock holdings had no effect. 
Richer households could obtain better coverage against risk by joining multiple iddir networks, and 
perhaps by joining iddir associations established in rich neighborhoods. As suggested by Hoddinott et 
al. (2005), the income and wealth status of a household could affect the intensity of participation in 
iddirs, but income and wealth are found to have an insignificant effect in defining the extensive margin 
of participation in these egalitarian associations. This evidence sets an interesting context to evaluate 
the effectiveness of such an inclusive social network in facilitating factor market transactions among 
households. 
Like many other social networks, iddir associations provide informal social insurance and 
information and strengthen trust among members of the association (Caeyers and Dercon, 2012). 
Besides providing linkages among members, iddirs reduce transaction costs and provide security 
against shirking or defection in the absence of formal contractual agreements. Rigorous empirical 
evidence as to whether these qualities of iddir networks are important to facilitate factor market 
transactions among smallholder farmers and to complement imperfect agricultural markets in rural 
economies is not yet available.  
 
3. Factor Markets In Ethiopia 
As in many other developing countries, rural areas of Ethiopia are characterized by imperfect or 
missing factor markets (Deininger et al., 2008; Deininger and Jin, 2008; Ghebru and Holden, 2008). In 
Ethiopia, land belongs to the state and landlords are only entitled to user rights. Under this form of 
ownership, landowners are not entitled to sell, transfer, or mortgage their land. Pender and Fafchamps 
(2006) point out that, in the absence of land redistribution, the only means of acquiring access to land 
in Ethiopia is through gifts, borrowing, fixed-rental, or sharecropping. They find that the latter is the 
most prevalent form of securing access to land. Sharecropping is a tenancy agreement between 
landowners and their tenants. It evolves on the premise that tenants share a portion of the harvested 
production with the landowner depending on their agreement, usually half or two-third of gross 
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production (see, for instance, Pender and Fafchamps, 2006). In some cases, landowners contribute 
some production inputs, generally draft-animal (oxen) or labor. In contrast, in fixed land rentals, the 
tenant pays a fixed amount of money, commonly in advance and assumes ownership of the land and the 
harvested production for the agreed production season.  
Similarly, the agricultural labor market in Ethiopia lacks formality. Labor transactions depend 
on traditional labor-sharing practices, which mainly involve paired-borrowing of labor between 
farming households in return for similar labor on another day (or season). As discussed in Krishnan and 
Sciubba (2009), labor-sharing practices in Ethiopia may also involve large-scale labor borrowing from 
a large number of households, which may be returned when a similar event is organized by 
contributing households. These practices sometimes exploit the seasonal variation in demand for labor 
among households in the crop planting, growing, and harvesting periods. For instance, if a household’s 
crops are not ready for harvest, the household continues to credit labor to other households who are in 
demand for it and gets the labor back when its crops are ready for harvest.  
Such traditional arrangements in local land and labor markets also extend to rural credit 
markets in Ethiopia. Despite recent progress, Ethiopia’s agricultural credit market is not yet well 
developed. Rural credit is predominantly covered by informal loan arrangements, including 
moneylenders, and exhibits the same screening, incentive, and enforcement problems found in many 
rural credit markets in developing countries (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990; Udry, 1990).  
To sum up, factor markets in Ethiopia are incomplete and are dominated by traditional 
arrangements. Most of these arrangements or transactions do not involve formal contractual 
agreements. Thus, their validity hinges on informal relationships and trust among agents. In the 
presence of these imperfect factor markets, investigating the role of iddir networks is crucial in 
designing alternative policy measures that aim at improving factor markets in agriculture. Social 
networks play a key role in trust formation (Fukuyama, 1995; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003) and 
information sharing (Barr, 2000). These qualities of social networks offer an interesting context to 
reduce information asymmetry among agents of rural factor markets, and hence, facilitate factor market 
transactions among farmers. 
In this paper, we empirically investigate the role of iddir, an indigenous social network in 
Ethiopia, in easing factor market imperfections in rural economies. We are specifically interested in 
investigating households’ factor market transaction dynamics when they join iddir networks. We 
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hypothesize that iddir networks improve poorly functioning factor markets in rural Ethiopia and, hence, 
improve smallholder farmers’ access to these markets. When information asymmetry is binding and 
lack of trust and reputation limits potential efficiency improvements in factor markets, iddir networks 
can serve as information hubs where households can exchange information relevant to their input 
endowment. Furthermore, and most importantly, the network built through iddir associations serves as 
a safety net (insurance) and a basis for stronger reciprocity among members.  
More specifically, we hypothesize that iddir networks can bridge the information and 
reputation related gaps between those who would like to acquire access to land or labor and those who 
would like to provide these factors through land or labor sharing agreements. Likewise, iddir networks 
can also improve households’ access to credit specifically from other iddir members by minimizing 
information asymmetry, thereby further strengthening trust among members. Furthermore, through 
their informational resource advantage, iddir members may even enjoy better access to factor markets 
that involve transactions with non-members. Since iddirs are formed among residents of (and often 
limited to) the same village, we expect that iddir membership may specifically improve households’ 
access to credit from neighbors and friends, who are more likely to be from the same village. In 
contrast, we expect that iddir membership could potentially crowd-out access to credit from 
moneylenders who, on account of the relatively high risk and transaction cost involved, charge higher 
interest rates. Although iddirs may not have a clearly defined legal basis to enforce market transactions, 
they are observed to be guided by sound set rules to which members can appeal in case of default, even 
if loans are made one-to-one without the institutional involvement of the iddir. In addition, these rules 
are strengthened through the social leverage that iddirs and their leaders are bestowed from members. 
These include group pressure and social penalties on individuals that fail to comply with agreed terms 
between members, similar to the roles played by community leaders in northern Nigeria to overcome 
loan enforcement problems (Udry, 1990). 
 
4. Data and Econometric Method  
4.1      Data source and sample description 
The data we use for this study comes from a longitudinal household survey collected to evaluate the 
Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) in Ethiopia. The data is collected from 68 food-insecure 
woredas (districts) randomly drawn from the 153 food-insecure woredas where the program operates in 
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Ethiopia. These 153 food-insecure woredas are found in the four main regions of Ethiopia.2 From each 
woreda, 2 to 3 PSNP beneficiary kebeles (villages) were randomly drawn as Enumeration Areas (EAs) 
from a pool of PSNP beneficiary kebeles. From each EA, 15 PSNP beneficiaries and 10 non-
beneficiaries households were randomly selected from an exhaustive list of beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries in each EA. Four rounds of interviews (2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012) were conducted with 
the sample households with two-year gaps. A more detailed exposition on the sampling design is given 
in Berhane et al. (2011).  
Table 1 presents the distribution of iddir membership across the surveys from the four main 
regions covered in the longitudinal survey. Some previous studies that focus on specific regions where 
iddir networks are particularly prevalent report higher iddir participation than are seen in our sample 
(Hoddinott et al., 2005; Dercon et al., 2006).3 A closer look at Table 1 suggests that iddir membership 
increases across the surveys, ranging from 51 percent in the first (2006) survey to 66 percent in the 
third (2010) survey. This generally increasing trend may be attributed to the increasing demand for the 
services that these networks provide and the concurrent expansion of the networks. This is not 
surprising given the increase in the recurrence of drought and other idiosyncratic shocks in rural 
Ethiopia in recent years and that membership in an iddir network can directly or indirectly mitigate 
such shocks for a household. The increment is particularly large between the two middle surveys. Thus, 
we focus on these two middle surveys in this study. However, we also use information from the first 
(2006) and fourth (2012) surveys to corroborate and test our identification strategy. In terms of timing, 
both middle surveys were conducted at similar times: The 2008 survey was fielded between late May 
and early July, while the 2010 survey was fielded in June and July. Detailed descriptive statistics of the 
variables in these two surveys is given in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
Table 1: Overall distribution of iddir membership across sample households of PSNP surveys 
 Survey 
 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Iddir-members 1,629 2,157 1,974 2,453 
Non-members 1,569 1,534 1,024 1,383 
Share iddir members, % 51 58 66 64 
 
2 The four main regions are Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, and Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples (SNNP). 
3 For instance, if we only consider the two regions (Amhara and SNNP region) in our sample where iddir associations are 
very common, we can see substantially higher rate of iddir subscription in the sample. 
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Though the data is not collected for the purpose of investigating the role of iddirs, the 
sampling design is well-suited for our purpose for the following reasons: First, iddir participation is 
unrelated to PSNP selection and its targeting criteria (or determinants). We perform some empirical 
exercises to investigate if indeed iddir participation is not directly determined by some observed 
livelihood characteristics that define PSNP participation. Thus, we explore the association between 
iddir membership and PSNP participation as well as other observable characteristics that may affect 
PSNP participation, including wealth status, income, food security status, and other observed socio-
economic variables. Table 2 presents these results. In the first column, we regress the propensity to join 
an iddir on different observable characteristics of households, including wealth, income, food security 
status, social status and other socio-demographic variables. The second and third columns extend this 
specification by including zone-level and woreda-level fixed effects, respectively.4 The results indicate 
that self-reported wealth, income, food security status, and PSNP participation are not statistically 
correlated with iddir participation. Rather, as expected, households’ socio-demographic characteristics, 
such as education, household size, and household’s social status in the village, are correlated with iddir 
participation. This is in line with findings presented in Hoddinott et al. (2005) and Dercon et al. (2006). 
Furthermore, recent studies that evaluated the PSNP point out that PSNP selection is largely based on 
assets, income, and food security status, which we tried to control for using observable household 
characteristics in our regressions (Andersson et al., 2009; Gilligan et al., 2009; Berhane et al., 2011; 
Berhane et al., 2014).  
Second, though indigenous social networks such as iddirs are not well-researched in Ethiopia, 
the few existing studies indicate that iddir networks are inclusive and open to all interested members of 
the community (Hoddinott et al., 2005; Dercon et al., 2006; Mariam, 2003). The fact that iddir 
networks are inclusive and uncorrelated with household wealth indicators has important implications 
for our identification strategy.  
 
 
 
 
4 Controlling for these spatial fixed-effects is crucial because we expect significant regional, zonal and woreda-level 
variation in the intensity of iddir practices. 
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Table 2—Correlates of iddir participation 
Variables considered 
Estimates with 
without  
spatial effects 
Estimates with 
zone-level fixed 
effects 
Estimates with 
woreda–level fixed 
effect 
Age of household head  0.001*** 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female household head  -0.005 -0.013 0.006 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) 
Household head attended school 0.087*** 0.056*** 0.062*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Household size  0.010*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Oxen -0.028*** -0.009 -0.007 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Land size (in hectare) -0.019*** -0.011* -0.010 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Equib-member5 0.136*** 0.129*** 0.113*** 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) 
Subjective wealth status: ‘‘Rich’’ 0.019 0.002 0.029 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) 
Subjective wealth status: ‘‘Average’’ 0.004 0.003 0.001 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
Subjective income status:  0.008 0.004 0.002 
‘‘More than adequate’’ (0.070) (0.066) (0.066) 
Subjective income status: ‘‘Adequate’’ 0.018 0.006 0.000 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
Food insecure household -0.012 -0.017 -0.015 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
PSNP beneficiary household -0.008 -0.003 0.003 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) 
Father of household head respected  0.068*** 0.053*** 0.013 
in village (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
Amhara region 0.545*** 0.654*** 0.337*** 
 (0.024) (0.022) (0.030) 
Oromiya region 0.409*** 0.737*** 0.395*** 
5 Equib is a form of ‘‘rotating credit and saving association’’ (ROSCA) in Ethiopia. ROSCAs functions as a source of 
informal finance in developing countries where “each member agrees to pay periodically into a common pool a small sum 
so that each, in rotation, can receive one large sum” (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990). Although both equib and iddir are social 
networks that operate through powerful social pressures, equib has distinct features, compared to iddir, as equib mainly 
functions as a financial intermediary, rather than as an inclusive social network of broader purpose. 
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 (0.026) (0.038) (0.025) 
SNNP region 0.616*** 0.755*** 0.609*** 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.026) 
Constant 0.005 -0.553*** -0.072* 
 (0.041) (0.046) (0.043) 
R-squared 0.226 0.377 0.376 
Number of individuals  2,293 2,293 2,293 
Number of observations 4,586 4,586 4,586 
Notes: In the first column of this table we regress the propensity to join an iddir on observable socio-demographic and -
economic characteristics of households. The second and third columns extend this specification by including zone-level and 
woreda-level fixed effects, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
The share of iddir membership for the balanced panel sample of 2,293 households for both 
middle surveys estimated in Table 2 is almost identical to the full sample figures in Table 1.6 In 2008, 
59.6 percent of sample households were members of iddir networks, while the corresponding rate in 
2010 is 67.5 percent. Other details and trends of the variables across both surveys are given in Table 
A1 in the Appendix. The identification strategy exploits the switching in membership status of 
households who were not iddir members in 2008, by following their iddir membership status in the 
next survey (2010). Out of the 2,293 sample households in 2008, 1,202 continued as members of an 
iddir network in 2010, 165 did not maintain their iddir membership, 345 households joined iddir 
networks after the 2008 survey (but before the 2010 survey), while 581 households remained non-
members in both surveys. In this study, we are particularly interested in the last two groups of 
households – those who joined iddir networks after the 2008 survey (but before the 2010 survey) and 
those households that remained non-members in both surveys. We exploit this variation in iddir 
membership status across both surveys to identify the role of iddir networks in factor market 
transactions. Specifically, we compare the change in households’ participation in factor market 
transactions between those who joined iddir networks after the 2008 survey and those who remained 
non-members in both surveys, before and after the former joined iddir networks. Observing the 
increasing trend in Table 1 and simple correlations in Table 2, we expect that this switching is either 
exogenous to our outcomes of interest or driven by factors that are dealt with in our estimation strategy. 
This comparison enables us to remove any time-invariant selection into iddir membership. 
6 The sample size in Table 2 is smaller than Table 1 because we consider those households who are in both surveys. We also 
exclude those households without adequate labor, so that they are beneficiaries of the direct support part of the PSNP 
program in Ethiopia. 
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Furthermore, in some of our specifications we employ time-varying controls that may induce iddir 
participation. For convenience, we label the 345 households who joined iddir networks after 2008 as 
our treatment group, while those 581 households who remained non-members in both surveys are 
control group households. 
4.2  Outcome variables of interest 
We are interested in investigating the role of iddir networks in complementing the poorly functioning 
agricultural land, labor, and credit markets. We are particularly interested in investigating households’ 
factor market (land, labor, and credit) transaction dynamics when they join social networks that provide 
them information, linkages, and social capital. As discussed in Section 3, we hypothesize that iddir 
networks can improve households’ access to sharecropping land. Similarly, we are also interested in 
examining the impact of iddir networks in facilitating labor-sharing practices. As discussed in Krishnan 
and Sciubba (2009), there are different types of labor-sharing practices in Ethiopia that involve varying 
numbers of participants. Here our focus is on a specific type of labor-sharing practice that commonly 
involves symmetric reciprocation of labor among parties involved in the network. 
Finally, we aim to estimate the impact of iddir networks in facilitating credit transactions 
among farmers and, hence, their role in easing liquidity constraints of smallholder farmers. We are 
particularly interested in estimating how iddir networks affect credit flow from friends and neighbors, 
those individuals who are expected to be members of the iddir network.7 Furthermore, we investigate 
whether iddir networks crowd-out expensive credit sources. By providing alternative sources of credit, 
we expect that iddir networks may crowd-out households’ credit from local moneylenders who charge 
high interest rates.8 Table 3 provides a list of the outcome variables of interest in this study and their 
summary statistics measured at the pre-treatment period (2008). Consistent with the literature on social 
networks, we generally expect that the potentially untapped role of iddir networks in factor market 
exchanges mainly works through trust formation, information sharing, and reducing enforcement costs 
that can instrumentally smooth the flow of transactions. Furthermore, these networks involve social 
7 Although some iddir associations provide soft loans to their members, this accounts for less than 1 percent in our data. Our 
focus is restricted to the indirect role of iddir networks in facilitating credit access from neighbors and friends. 
8 If iddir associations also include relatives, the effect of iddir membership on households’ credit access from relatives may 
improve. However, in practice, iddir formation is heavily affected by neighborhood and friendship, rather than familial 
relationships.  
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support that enables them to impose strong social sanctions on households who defect, which is an 
effective tool and guarantee for members of the network.  
Table 3 shows that both treatment and control group households have statistically similar pre-
treatment factor market transactions for many of our outcome variables. Before households in the 
treatment group joined an iddir, the degree of involvement in factor market transactions for both the 
treatment and control group households was fairly similar. This helps our identification strategy, 
ensuring that we are comparing similar households. More specifically, around 7 percent of the 
treatment group households sharecropped-in land in the base year (2008), while the corresponding rate 
for those control group households is 10 percent. Similarly, Table 3 shows that more than 50 percent of 
households borrowed at least 20 Birr in the previous 12 months.9 The most common source of credit 
was relatives, friends and neighbors, micro-finance institutions, and informal moneylenders (Arata 
Abedari). The distributions of these sources of credit are statistically comparable across the treatment 
and control group households, except for credit from informal sources. 
Table 3: Factor market transaction comparison between treatment and control groups in base year (2008 
survey) 
 Treatment group Control group Difference 
Panel A: Land transactions    
Sharecropping-in 0.070 (0.255) 0.098 (0.298) -0.029 
Sharecropping-out 0.110 (0.314) 0.157 (0.364) -0.046** 
Panel B: Labor transactions    
Labor-sharing-main season 0.278 (0.449) 0.289 (0.454) -0.011 
Panel C: Credit transactions and sources 
Friends and neighbors 0.125 (0.331) 0.129 (0.336) -0.004 
Relatives 0.151 (0.358) 0.158 (0.365) -0.008 
Micro-finance and government sources 0.148 (0.355) 0.364 (0.364) -0.009 
Informal lender (Arata Abedari) 0.099 (0.298) 0.041 (0.199) 0.057*** 
Other sources 0.055 (0.228) 0.043 (0.203) 0.012 
Number of households 345 581  
Notes: Column 1 and 2 present the mean factor market transactions for the treatment and control group households in the 
base year (2008) (with standard deviations in parentheses), while column 3 presents mean differences between both groups. 
In Panel A, we compare land transactions between both groups, while Panel B and C make a similar comparison for labor 
and credit transactions, respectively. ***, **, * indicate that differences are significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 
0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
9 Around 25 percent of this borrowing is for consumption purposes, while 13 percent is drawn for purchasing farm inputs. 
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4.3 Econometric method and identification strategy 
As discussed in Section 4.1, we exploit the variation in iddir membership across both surveys (2008 
and 2010) to empirically identify the effect of this indigenous network in facilitating factor market 
exchanges. We use a difference-in-differences approach and compare factor market transactions of 
households that joined iddir networks (treatment group) with those non-member households (control 
group), before and after the former joined iddir networks. Such an identification strategy helps us to 
cancel out time-invariant selection into iddir membership based on some time-invariant unobservable 
factors. Furthermore, to capture some time-varying factors that might induce iddir participation, we 
control for households’ time-varying demographic and socio-economic characteristics, as well as their 
exposure to shocks. Note that iddir networks are formed with the aim of supporting members in case of 
death in the household or another type of idiosyncratic shock. These shocks can drive some dynamics 
in factor market transaction, and those households who recently suffered death of a family member or 
other type of shock might be more likely to join these networks. Thus, we need to explicitly control for 
shocks that may induce iddir participation. More explicitly, we estimate the following difference-in-
differences (DID) equation: 
Yht = β0 + β1Th + β2Post + β3(Th * Post) + β4Xht + αv + εht (1) 
where Yht is a binary variable that stands for the households’ participation in land, labor, and credit 
transactions. Th is a dummy variable for households from the treatment group (equal to one if the 
household became an iddir member after the 2008 surveys, zero otherwise); while Post stands for a 
period after the treatment households joined iddir networks (a dummy that takes a value equal to one 
for 2010, zero otherwise). β1 captures pre-treatment potential differences in factor market transactions 
between the treatment and control group households. Our parameter of interest, β3, captures the 
interaction effect between iddir membership and the latter survey year (2010). β4 captures the effect of 
other time-varying and time-invariant covariates, while αv absorbs village-level fixed effects. εht 
captures other unobserved factors that may induce heterogeneity in factor market transactions. 
Our parameter of interest, β3, measures the effect of change in iddir membership status on the 
change in household’s participation in factor market transactions across both surveys. Identifying β3 
hinges on the common trend assumption. This assumption implies that in the absence of iddir 
participation those households who joined iddir networks (after 2008) would have had, on average, a 
similar growth pattern in their factor market transactions as those households who did not join. This 
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assumption is not directly testable, but the implication of the assumption can be tested using pre-
treatment survey data. We have access to pre-treatment data from the 2006 and 2008 surveys for many 
of our outcome variables. Thus, we estimate equation (1) using the pre-treatment surveys (2006 and 
2008), assuming placebo treatment for those households who joined an iddir after 2008. We know that 
our households from the treatment group joined iddir networks after 2008, thus, estimating equation (1) 
using the 2006 and 2008 survey should yield a treatment effect close to zero. Our placebo regression 
results (see Table A2 in Appendix) unambiguously confirm this argument. These estimates, along with 
the comparable pre-treatment factor market transactions shown in Table 3, suggest that our treatment 
effects are not driven by some sort of selection based on unobserved heterogeneity among the treated 
and control group households.  
Since all our outcome variables of interest are binary response outcomes, we estimate equation 
(1) using linear panel data models and probit models. We rigorously attempt different specifications of 
the covariates, including some non-linear effects of the variables. As mentioned earlier, the intensity 
and prevalence of iddir networks can vary across woredas, and perhaps across villages. Thus, we also 
control for village-level fixed effects in some of our specifications.10 For each factor market (land, 
labor, and credit), we estimate equation (1) without any control, with controls, and with village-level 
fixed effects. We estimate equation (1) for two land transaction outcomes of interest: probability of 
sharecropping-in and sharecropping-out of land in the main (meher) season. Similarly, we estimate 
equation (1) for households’ tendency to participate in labor-sharing practices in the main season. 
Finally, we estimate equation (1) for modeling households’ credit access from neighbors and friends, as 
well as their credit access from local moneylenders. For each of these estimations, we present treatment 
effects estimated through linear regression models and marginal effects from probit models. Not 
surprisingly, the treatment effects from the linear regression models are very comparable with the 
implied marginal effects from the probit models. 
 
5. Estimation Results and Discussion  
In this section, we present and discuss the main results. Table 4 presents the estimation results for the 
land transactions of households: sharecropping-in and sharecropping-out practices. Columns 1 to 3 
10 To ensure that our estimates of interest persist even after controlling household’s time-invariant unobserved differences 
for each outcome of interest, we also estimate our models controlling for household level fixed effects. However, this forces 
many of the time-invariant variable effects to disappear, and hence these results are not reported here. 
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present the estimation results for household’s propensity to participate in sharecropping-in practices 
considering different specifications. In the first column, we present estimates without controls, while in 
the second column we control for demographic and socio-economic variables. In the third column, we 
extend the specification by controlling village level-fixed effects. Similarly, columns 4 to 6 of Table 4 
present the estimation results for households’ participation in sharecropping-out practices without 
controls, with controls, and with village-level fixed effects, respectively.11  
Table 4: Effect of iddir networks on land transactions, difference-in-differences estimates 
Explanatory variables 
considered 
Sharecropping-in Sharecropping-out 
(1) 
Without 
controls 
(2) 
With 
Controls 
(3) 
With village-
fixed effect 
(4) 
Without 
controls 
(5) 
With 
controls 
(6) 
With village 
fixed effect 
β1 (treated) -0.029 -0.033* -0.054** -0.046* -0.018 -0.042 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.030) 
β2 (Post) -0.034** -0.050*** -0.047*** 0.003 0.000 0.003 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) 
β3 (treated*Post) 0.092*** 0.094*** 0.088*** 0.057* 0.058* 0.054* 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) 
Probit DID: Marginal effects¥ 0.093*** 0.091*** 0.124*** 0.058** 0.064** 0.066** 
    (0.028) (0.027) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) 
Other controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Regional dummies (4) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Village-level-fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Constant 0.098*** 0.133*** 0.136** 0.157*** 0.276*** 0.173** 
 (0.012) (0.033) (0.054) (0.015) (0.043) (0.071) 
R-squared 0.007 0.118 0.233 0.003 0.101 0.216 
Number of observations  1,852 1,852 1,852 1,852 1,852 1,852 
Notes: Each column presents difference-in-differences estimations for household’s involvement in land transactions. The 
second and fifth columns include four regional dummy variables corresponding to the main regions of Ethiopia. Estimates 
on the third and sixth columns additionally  include 65 village (kebele)-level fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***, **, * indicates significance level at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.  
¥Marginal effects are from a probit difference-in-differences estimation. 
 
Consistent with our hypothesis, iddir membership causally improves households’ probability 
to participate in land markets through share tenancy, particularly by enabling them to enter into 
sharecropping arrangements, the most common and vibrant forms of land tenancy contracts in Ethiopia 
(Pender and Fafchamps, 2005). Specifically, joining iddir networks improves households’ probability 
11 Full set of estimates for all variables in the various specifications are given in Table A3 in the appendix.  
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to acquire access to land through sharecropping-in by about 9 percentage points, while also 
symmetrically improving landlords’ probability to sharecrop/loan-out their land by around 6 percentage 
points. These results are quantitatively strong and stable over alternative specifications and robustness 
checks. Particularly, these estimates are robust to the inclusion of many covariates and village level-
fixed effects. These estimates suggest that iddir networks do indeed bridge the gap between those who 
would like to offer their land for others to cultivate (for various reasons, including efficiency and risk 
pooling considerations) and those who would like to acquire access to land lease through share tenancy. 
This is particularly appealing in the Ethiopian context where formal land markets are inhibited by legal 
restrictions on land sales market; alternative tenancy mechanisms are subject to production risk, 
shirking on labor effort, and high cost of monitoring; and there are significant imperfections in other 
factor markets (e.g., seed and fertilizers). These estimates can plausibly be attributed to the role of iddir 
networks in reducing factor market inefficiency resulting from information asymmetry between 
demanders and suppliers of land, as well as to their role as a safety net by providing security and trust 
for agents interested in land transactions. As discussed in Section 2, iddir members meet regularly for 
general meetings or when members face idiosyncratic shocks. These kinds of events allow members to 
discuss their general activities and share information, including those relevant to their demand and 
supply of factor markets. This in turn, reduces search costs, reduces potential land use inefficiency due 
to information asymmetry, and reduces monitoring costs. Iddir networks thus play a crucial role in 
reducing transaction costs in relation to the screening and enforcement of land transactions. The fact 
that such networks strengthen friendship and trust among members implies that farmers reduce their 
screening cost as they have inside information about potential tenants and landlords. Furthermore, iddir 
networks reduce potential enforcement problems through strict iddir rules and the social stigma and 
social disapproval through which these networks punish rule-breakers.  
Table 5 presents difference-in-differences estimates on the effect of iddir membership on 
labor-sharing practices of households. Column 1 presents the estimation results without controlling for 
socio-economic and demographic variables, while column 2 presents results with these controls. In 
column 3, we additionally control for village level-fixed effects.12  
 
12 Full set of estimates for all variables in the various specifications are given in Table A4 in the Appendix. 
18 
 
                                                          
Table 5: Effect of iddir networks on labor transactions, difference-in-differences estimates 
Explanatory variables considered 
Labor-sharing (Main season) 
(1) 
Without controls 
(2) 
With Controls 
(3) 
With village-fixed effect 
β1 (treated) -0.011 -0.023 -0.010 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.039) 
β2 (Post) 0.033 0.025 0.025 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) 
β3 (treated*Post) 0.101** 0.098** 0.101** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Probit DID: Marginal effects¥ 0.099*** 0.101*** 0.109*** 
 (0.044) (0.043) (0.042) 
Other controls  No Yes Yes 
Regional dummy variables (4) No Yes Yes 
Village-level fixed effects (65) No No Yes 
Constant 0.289*** 0.167*** 0.244*** 
 (0.019) (0.055) (0.090) 
R-squared 0.010 0.100 0.213 
Number of observations  1,852 1,852 1,852 
Notes: Each column presents difference-in-differences estimations of equation (1) for household’s involvement in labor 
transactions. The second column includes regional dummies corresponding to the main regions of Ethiopia. Estimates on 
the third column additionally include 65 village (kebele)-level fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.    
***, **, * indicates significance level at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. 
¥ Marginal effects are from a probit difference-in-differences estimation. 
 
The estimates in Table 5 indicate that iddir membership causally improves the probability of 
households’ participation in labor-sharing arrangements by about 10 percentage points. These estimates 
remain stable even after controlling for households’ observable characteristics and regional and village 
level-fixed effects. Conceptually, this treatment effect represents a remarkable improvement in the 
households’ demand for labor and the allocation of excess agricultural labor supply. Intuitively, iddir 
networks are well-suited institutions for creating paired partnerships and reciprocal group labor 
exchange through their frequent meetings and group level discussions. Iddir networks not only provide 
access to potential members who would like to engage in labor-sharing, but they also provide the 
needed labor at the right time by exploiting the seasonal variation in demand for labor among members 
of the network. Recalling previous studies on the effect of labor-sharing practices on farmers’ 
productivity (Krishnan and Sciubba, 2009), our results indirectly indicate that iddir networks can also 
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boost smallholder farmers’ productivity by generating social capital. In this sense, our results 
complement previous studies on the effect of labor-sharing networks on economic performance.  
Finally, in Table 6 we present the estimation results associated with the effect of iddir 
membership on credit access for households from different sources. Columns 1 to 3 present the 
estimation results for households’ credit access from neighbors and friends, those households who are 
expected to be members of the iddir network. In the first column, we present estimates without 
controls, while the second column presents results with additional socio-economic and demographic 
controls. In the third column, we present the estimation results controlling for village level-fixed 
effects. Similarly, columns 4 to 6 present difference-in-differences estimates for households’ credit 
access from local moneylenders (Arata Abedari) without controls, with controls, and with village-level 
fixed effects, respectively.13 
Table 6: Effect of iddir networks on credit access, difference-in-differences estimates 
Explanatory variables 
considered 
Credit from neighbors and friends 
Credit from local moneylenders 
(Arata Abedari) 
(1) 
Without 
controls 
(2) 
With 
controls 
(3) 
With village- 
fixed effect 
(4) 
Without 
controls 
(5) 
With 
controls 
(6) 
With village 
fixed effect 
β1 (treated) -0.004 -0.041* -0.063** 0.057*** 0.033** 0.053*** 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.030) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019) 
β2 (Post) -0.010 -0.016 -0.023 -0.003 -0.008 -0.004 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
β3 (treated*Post) 0.074** 0.068** 0.072** -0.046** -0.043** -0.043** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Probit DID: Marginal effects¥ 0.074** 0.065** 0.075** -0.046** -0.034** -0.070*** 
 (0.034) (0.031) (0.033) (0.023) (0.020) (0.032) 
Other controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Regional dummies (4) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Village-level-fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Constant 0.129*** 0.026 -0.006 0.041*** 0.028 0.045 
 (0.014) (0.040) (0.070) (0.009) (0.027) (0.044) 
R-squared 0.005 0.094 0.162 0.010 0.054 0.204 
No. of observations  1,852 1,852 1,852 1,852 1,852 1,852 
Notes: Each column presents difference-in-differences estimations for household’s access to credit from different sources. 
The second and fifth columns include four regional dummy variables corresponding to the main regions of Ethiopia. 
Estimates on the third and sixth column additionally include 65 village (kebele)-level fixed effects. Robust standard errors 
13 Full set of estimates for all variables in the various specifications are given in Table A5 in the appendix. 
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are in parentheses.***, **, * indicates significance level at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.  
¥ Marginal effects are from a probit difference-in-differences estimation. 
 
The estimation results in Table 6 show that iddir membership, in the same fashion as the 
analyses of other factors presented earlier, causally improves households’ access to credit from friends 
and neighbors by about 7 percentage points. The results are fairly stable across different specifications. 
These estimates tell a consistent story in the sense that friends and neighbors are commonly members 
of the iddir network, and hence the flow of credit from these members in the village should increase. 
These findings support previous studies in Ethiopia which argue that membership in social networks by 
smallholder farmers affect their credit access from semi-formal institutions (Berhane et al., 2009; Ali 
and Deininger, 2014). Intuitively, this implies that iddir networks play an important role in overcoming 
households’ liquidity constraints by availing potential lenders.14 This, in turn, suggests that iddir 
networks can play a potential role in overcoming some of the prevalent high transactions costs in rural 
credit markets by providing information and security against defections in credit transactions.  
The estimation results in columns 4 to 6 of Table 6 show the effect of iddir networks in 
crowding-out credit sources that charge high interest rates. These results show that iddir membership 
crowds-out credit from local moneylenders (Arata Abedari) who are often blamed locally for being 
exploitative by charging very high interest rates. Households who joined iddir networks reduced their 
reliance on local moneylenders for credit by around 4 to 5 percentage points. These results highlight 
the potential of indigenous rural institutions and networks, such as iddir associations, for crowding-out 
other informal lenders that are not perhaps related to the network and charge higher interest rates. This 
is in contrast to the ineffectiveness of formal credit institutions in driving out informal moneylenders 
(Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990; Bell, 1990). This result potentially arises because, unlike formal credit 
institutions, iddir members have greater access to local information useful for dealing with problems of 
screening, monitoring, and enforcement, to which formal banks do not have access. Iddir member 
lenders have lower transactions costs than moneylenders. This has crucial implications for the supply 
of credit and the level of interest rates charged, which may drive moneylenders out of the market. For 
14 One possible question here is whether the three factor markets are interlinked and instead one market (e.g., credit market) 
is deriving the other market (e.g., land market) as discussed in Ray (1998:561). To investigate this, we compute simple 
associations (cross-correlations) among the outcome variables of interest in this study. We found insignificant correlation 
among the different outcomes in the three different factor markets. More specifically, we compute simple associations 
between our credit market transactions indicators and land market transactions indicators for the whole sample in Table 2 
and note that there is no significant association among the transactions in different markets. This is in line with the previous 
literature which generally show that direct credit linkages between landowners and tenants are rare in Ethiopia.  
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instance, Aleem (1990) argues that one reason why moneylenders charge high interest rates is that they 
have high average costs related to screening and enforcement. We also attempt to estimate the effect of 
iddir networks on crowding-out credit from formal government sources and micro-finance institutions, 
but the treatment effect estimates were statistically insignificant.15 This is of course not unexpected, 
given the low interest rate these institutions charge and their supply of reliable and substantially larger 
loans. This provides interesting policy implications for countries like Ethiopia, which are striving to 
provide formal credit access to smallholder farmers. 
To summarize, the overall empirical results presented above are quite intuitive. The results 
generally highlight that informal indigenous networks can help the formation of physical and social 
capital that can improve factor market transactions among smallholder farmers. Our findings are robust 
to alternative model specifications and explanations. We rigorously attempt to check alternative model 
specifications and explanations that we think may affect our identification strategy. For instance, some 
of the existing sociological literature on iddir networks in Ethiopia (for instance, Mariam, 2003), which 
focused on specific regions and very few villages, suggests that households who are not iddir members 
are commonly new arrival immigrants. If such behavior somehow prevails in our data, it may confound 
the effect of joining iddir networks with some immigration or family (network) formation effect. To 
rule out such confounding effects, we estimate our models restricting the sample to those households 
whose household head was born in the village where he or she is currently living. Table A6 in the 
appendix presents these results. All estimates are quite similar in magnitude to the main estimates 
presented in Tables 4, 5 and 6.  
As mentioned in Section 4.3, we also test the implication of our common trend assumption 
using pre-treatment surveys. This assumption implies, that in the absence of iddir networks, both 
treatment and control group households would share identical time trends in factor market transactions. 
Our placebo estimation results (see Table A2 in the Appendix) indicate that both treatment and control 
group households share identical pre-treatment time trend in factor market transactions, as indicated by 
the insignificant and almost zero treatment effect estimates.16 This evidence suggests that the treatment 
effects estimated, and hence our main results, are not driven by potential differential time trend 
between the treatment and control group households. 
15 These results are available from the authors on request. 
16 Since some of the households joined the survey at a later stage (at 2008), the sample size in these placebo regressions is 
slightly lower than the sample used for our main estimations. 
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One could also argue that some of the relationships and networks already built in labor-sharing and 
land transactions might lead to iddir formation, thereby suggesting reverse causality. There are two 
reasons why such a scenario should be ruled out. First, as discussed earlier, it is important to note that 
iddirs are traditionally intended for serving as insurance and risk-sharing networks and have been there 
since time immemorial. They are the most common and stable social networks of Ethiopia, including in 
urban areas. As such, they are more generic and less likely to be driven by such localized small group 
labor sharing practices. Second, technically, our identification strategy also rules out this type of 
reverse causality. We are identifying the effect of change in iddir membership status on change in 
labor-sharing practices. If the reverse causality is in effect, there would not be a change in labor-sharing 
practices, and hence we would not find any effect of joining iddir networks on these factor market 
transactions. 
As a further robustness exercise, we also use the fourth survey (2012 survey) instead of the 
third (2010 survey) in estimating our difference-in-differences equations for some of our outcome 
variables. We specifically assess the path of factor market performance of those treated households 
compared to the control group households even at later years. This exercise, for which the estimates are 
provided in Table A7 in the Appendix, provides two further insights. First, once households join iddir 
networks, they continue enjoying the benefits of the network as measured in the relative growth in 
factor market performance. Second, these results also avoid concerns on the timing of the measurement 
of some of our outcomes. For instance, the question related to credit access spans the last 12 months. 
However, we do not know exactly when the households joined these networks, only that they joined 
after the 2008 survey and before the 2010 survey. Thus, these estimates confirm that the effects of iddir 
networks persist even if we assume that the treatment group households joined the iddir networks at the 
onset of the 2010 survey. More generally, many of the results for the outcomes for which we have data 
are similar to the main estimates given in Tables 4, 5 and 6.  
Finally, we carried out several other robustness checks. Compared to Amhara and SNNP 
regions, iddir networks are not widely practiced in Tigray region. To assess if such heterogeneity can 
confound some of the results, we estimate all our models excluding sample households from Tigray 
region, and confirm the results do not change.17 Although many of our explanatory variables do not 
vary much across the years, we also attempt to control for some background characteristics such as 
17 These results are available from the authors on request. 
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land, labor, and livestock assets of households from previous surveys to capture inertia effects and 
initial differences among the treated and control group households. However, doing this did not affect 
any of our estimates, perhaps because these assets did not exhibit substantial dynamics across the 
surveys. Finally, we attempt to assess if the effect of iddir networks varies across different types of 
households. However, we are slightly constrained in performing this exercise because we only know 
whether the household is a member of an iddir in the village. We cannot identify if they subscribe to 
more than one iddir network.18 As pointed out in Hoddinott et al. (2005) and Dercon et al. (2006), 
households (particularly richer households) may subscribe to more than one iddir, which suggests that 
the heterogeneous effect of iddirs cannot be ruled out. However, our sampling and identification 
strategy helps us to minimize such heterogeneity as we are comparing households who have just joined 
with those who have not. It is less likely that households would suddenly subscribe to many iddirs in 
such a short time.  
 
6. Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications 
Using a detailed longitudinal household survey data from Ethiopia, we empirically show that 
indigenous social networks such as iddir associations can play a crucial role in facilitating factor 
market transactions. Iddir networks are the most popular and widely available social networks both in 
urban and rural areas of Ethiopia. The fact that these networks are inclusive, offers interesting context 
and perspective through which to investigate their role in overcoming some of the factor market 
imperfections in rural economies. While studies such as Krishnan and Sciubba (2009) investigate the 
compositional and architectural impact of social networks on economic performance (or agricultural 
output), we investigate the role of iddir networks in facilitating factor market transactions, which are 
key inputs for improving the economic performance of smallholder farmers. To circumvent the 
selection of households into iddir networks, we rely on a difference-in-differences approach by 
comparing the growth in factor market transactions between those households who joined iddir 
networks and those who did not, before and after the former joined the networks.  
The fact that iddir networks avail information, strengthen trust, and reduce enforcement costs 
has important implications in view of the binding factor market imperfections in rural economies. 
Owing to these qualities, iddir networks can substantially reduce transaction costs and information 
18 Note also that we lack data to assess whether these transactions are intra-iddir or otherwise. 
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asymmetry among agents of factor markets, facilitating smooth transactions within factor markets. For 
instance, in countries like Ethiopia where land insecurity is a limiting factor in land transactions 
(Deininger et al., 2008; Ghebru and Holden, 2008; Deininger and Jin, 2008), understanding the role of 
iddir associations is crucial. In this context, our results indicate that iddir networks offer alternative 
ways to overcome land market imperfections by bridging the gap between those farmers who own 
excess land (in excess of their draft power), and those with excess draft power (in excess of their land 
endowment).19 Similarly, we find that iddir networks can improve agricultural labor market 
imperfections by facilitating labor-sharing practices among households. While Krishnan and Sciubba 
(2009) find that social capital generated through labor-sharing arrangements matters for agricultural 
output, our results show that indigenous social networks, such as iddir associations, generate social 
capital by facilitating labor-sharing arrangements. 
Another important implication of iddir networks relates to credit markets and their role in 
easing the liquidity constraints of smallholder farmers. Access to credit is a central factor in 
transforming smallholder farming of the Ethiopian type. Dercon and Christiaensen (2011) emphasize 
that credit constraints and uninsured agricultural production are key factors that keep smallholder 
farmers in poverty. In this context, our results show that iddir networks boost the credit access of 
households from potential members of the iddir association. Iddir networks improve households’ credit 
access from friends and neighbors. Interestingly, our findings also indicate that iddir networks crowd-
out expensive and inefficient credit sources, including informal local moneylenders (Arata Abedari) 
without virtually affecting formal credit sources such as microfinance institutions. This is intuitively 
expected, because iddir members (both borrowers and lenders) have privileged access to information, 
which lowers the transaction costs associated with their credit transactions. Thus, households’ access to 
alternative, and perhaps, cheaper credit sources through these networks can drive high cost informal 
lenders out of the credit market. This is particularly appealing in view of the fact that formal credit 
markets are commonly thought to be ineffective at crowding-out informal moneylenders in rural areas 
(Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990; Udry, 1990).  
To summarize, given the direct and indirect roles that iddir networks can play in factor 
markets and other development initiatives, new thinking regarding ways of supporting these networks 
is needed. As suggested by Dercon et al. (2006), policy makers may focus on scaling up the 
19 However, the efficiency of these transactions has to be investigated, which is a potential future avenue of research. 
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institutional capacity of these networks without diluting their institutional strength. Although our 
results highlight the potential of indigenous social networks, such as iddirs, in facilitating factor market 
transactions, further investigation into how to exploit the potential of these networks is needed. One 
possible dimension might be forming partnerships between iddir networks and other government and 
non-government organizations as suggested by Pankhurst (2008). Such partnerships may be vital in 
expanding formal credit institutions by combining the desirable qualities of iddir networks with the 
institutional capacity of the formal organizations. Whichever direction is considered, there needs to be 
an initiative to tap the potential that these networks offer. 
However, this study is not without its limitations. First, it is understood that we are estimating 
a reduced form equation where the mechanics and channels through which iddir networks affect factor 
markets are not clearly visible. Second, we only know whether the households are members of an iddir 
in the village. There might be heterogeneity among the services given by different iddirs, and, hence, 
households subscribing to different iddirs might be subject to heterogeneous treatment effects. Though 
not expected in such a short time span, households may also subscribe to more than one iddir 
association simultaneously. It would be interesting to investigate the heterogeneous effects of these 
networks and their policy implications. For instance, Krishnan and Sciubba (2009) emphasize that the 
impact of social networks on economic performance heavily depends on the size and type of the 
network. Finally, although iddir networks facilitate factor market transactions, further research on the 
efficiency of such transactions is worth considering. More generally and as also argued in Fafchamps 
(2006), social networks present both positive and negative externalities emanating from the 
complicated attributes of these networks; thus, further research on the potential of these indigenous 
networks would help in designing better policy interventions. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables considered 
Explanatory variables considered 
Full sample Selected sample 
2008 
Survey 
2010 
Survey Difference 
2008 
Survey 
2010 
Survey Difference 
Age of household head  44.813 45.895 -1.082*** 44.474 45.489 -1.015 
Head female 0.182 0.195 -0.013 0.200 0.218 -0.018 
Household head attended schooling 0.359 0.623 -0.264*** 0.279 0.589 -0.310*** 
Household size 5.611 5.657 -0.047 5.512 5.610 -0.098 
Oxen 0.781 0.800 -0.020 0.868 0.892 -0.024 
Land (in hectare) 1.008 1.252 -0.244*** 1.065 1.252 -0.188*** 
Iddir-member household 0.596 0.675 -0.078*** 0.000 0.373 -0.373*** 
Equib-member household 0.090 0.099 -0.009 0.035 0.057 -0.023** 
Subjective wealth status: ‘‘Rich’’ 0.043 0.043 -0.000 0.045 0.033 0.012 
Subjective wealth status: ‘‘Average’’ 0.201 0.252 -0.051*** 0.227 0.225 0.002 
Subjective income: more than 
adequate 0.005 0.009 -0.003 0.006 0.003 0.003 
Subjective income: adequate 0.203 0.263 -0.061*** 0.240 0.251 -0.011 
Food insecure household 0.751 0.464 0.287*** 0.732 0.492 0.240*** 
PSNP beneficiary household 0.478 0.456 0.022 0.518 0.482 0.037 
Father of head respected in village 0.576 0.576 0.000 0.487 0.487 0.000 
Exposure to shock† 0.422 0.298 0.124*** 0.327 0.259 0.068*** 
Tigray region 0.141 0.141 0.000 0.295 0.295 0.000 
Amhara region 0.390 0.390 0.000 0.308 0.308 0.000 
Oromiya region 0.205 0.205 0.000 0.254 0.254 0.000 
SNNP region 0.265 0.265 0.000 0.144 0.144 0.000 
Number of observations  2,293 2,293 2,293 926 926 926 
Notes: This table provides mean estimates and differences across both surveys for the variables of the complete and selected 
sample. 
† Shocks include death of family members and other types of unplanned events that affect production, including drought, 
flood, erosion and other.  
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Table A2: Placebo regression on pre-treatment sample using 2006 and 2008 surveys  
Explanatory variables 
considered 
Sharecropping-in 
Sharecropping or 
loaning-out 
Labor-sharing 
(main-season) 
(1) 
Without 
controls 
(2) 
With 
controls 
(3) 
Without 
controls 
(4) 
With 
controls 
(5) 
Without 
controls 
(6) 
With 
controls 
β1 (treated) -0.011 0.020 -0.064*** -0.015 0.061* 0.043 
 (0.018) (0.023) (0.025) (0.031) (0.034) (0.041) 
β2 (Post) -0.002 0.006 -0.010 -0.008 0.164*** 0.149*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.018) (0.019) (0.028) (0.027) 
β3 (treated*Post) -0.015 -0.018 0.019 0.021 -0.048 -0.068 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.032) (0.032) (0.048) (0.045) 
Other controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Regional dummies (4) No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Village-level fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Constant  0.059*** 0.118*** 0.121*** 0.157** 0.209*** 0.371*** 
 
(0.009) (0.049) (0.013) (0.065) (0.018) (0.089) 
R-squared 0.002 0.115 0.006 0.136 0.015 0.167 
No. of observations  1,434 1,434 1,434 1,434 1,434 1,434 
Notes: Each column presents difference-in-differences estimations for household’s involvement in factor market 
transactions. In this table we are using pre-treatment surveys to estimate placebo treatment effects. We did this exercise only 
for the outcome variables where we have complete information in both pre-treatment surveys. Estimates in the second, 
fourth, and sixth columns include 65 village (kebele)-level fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, 
* indicates significance level at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
Table A3: Effect of iddir networks on land transactions, difference-in-differences estimates, full model 
results  
Explanatory variables 
considered 
Sharecropping-in Sharecropping-out 
(1) 
Without 
controls 
(2) 
With 
Controls 
(3) 
With village- 
fixed effect 
(4) 
Without 
controls 
(5) 
With 
controls 
(6) 
With village 
fixed effect 
β1 (treated) -0.029 -0.033* -0.054** -0.046* -0.018 -0.042 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.030) 
β2 (Post) -0.034** -0.050*** -0.047*** 0.003 0.000 0.003 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) 
β3 (treated*Post) 0.092*** 0.094*** 0.088*** 0.057* 0.058* 0.054* 
 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) 
Probit DID:  0.093*** 0.091*** 0.124*** 0.058** 0.064** 0.066** 
Marginal effects¥ (0.028) (0.027) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) 
Age of household head  
 
-0.001** -0.001*** 
 
-0.001** -0.001** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Female household head   -0.068*** -0.060*** 
 
-0.012 -0.027 
  
(0.017) (0.017) 
 
(0.022) (0.022) 
Head attended school  0.038*** 0.022 
 
0.022 0.003 
  
(0.014) (0.014) 
 
(0.018) (0.018) 
Number of adults 
 
0.008 0.010* 
 
-0.005 -0.001 
  
(0.005) (0.005) 
 
(0.007) (0.007) 
Number of oxen 
 
0.020*** 0.019** 
 
0.008 0.004 
  
(0.008) (0.008) 
 
(0.010) (0.010) 
Land (in hectare) 
 
-0.001 0.003 
 
0.009 0.013 
  
(0.007) (0.007) 
 
(0.009) (0.009) 
Equib-member 
 
-0.047 -0.044 
 
-0.028 -0.044 
  
(0.031) (0.031) 
 
(0.039) (0.039) 
PSNP beneficiary   -0.034** -0.029**  -0.026 -0.020 
  (0.013) (0.013)  (0.017) (0.017) 
Exposure to shocks   0.021 -0.013  0.002 -0.031 
  (0.014) (0.015)  (0.018) (0.019) 
Regional dummies (4) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Constant 0.098*** 0.133*** 0.136** 0.157*** 0.276*** 0.173** 
 
(0.012) (0.033) (0.054) (0.015) (0.043) (0.071) 
R-squared 0.007 0.118 0.233 0.003 0.101 0.216 
Number of observations  1,852 1,852 1,852 1,852 1,852 1,852 
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Notes: Each column presents difference-in-differences estimations of equation (1) for household’s involvement in land 
transactions. Except the first and fourth columns, all estimations include four regional dummies corresponding to the main 
regions of Ethiopia. Estimates on the third and sixth columns include 65 village (kebele)-level fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicates significance level at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. 
¥ Marginal effects are from a probit difference-in-differences estimation. 
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Table A4: Effect of iddir networks on labor transactions, difference-in-differences estimates, full model 
results 
Explanatory variables considered 
Labor-sharing (Main season) 
(1) 
Without controls 
(2) 
With controls 
(3) 
With village-fixed effect 
β1 (treated) -0.011 -0.023 -0.010 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.039) 
β2 (Post) 0.033 0.025 0.025 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) 
β3 (treated*Post) 0.101** 0.098** 0.101** 
 
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Probit DID: Marginal effects¥ 0.099*** 0.101*** 0.109*** 
 (0.044) (0.043) (0.042) 
Age of household head  
 
-0.001 -0.001 
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
Female household head   0.055* 0.037 
  
(0.029) (0.027) 
Head attended school  -0.053** -0.034 
  
(0.023) (0.023) 
Number of adults 
 
0.025*** 0.017** 
  
(0.009) (0.009) 
Number of oxen 
 
0.026** 0.020 
  
(0.013) (0.013) 
Land (in hectare) 
 
0.028** 0.028** 
  
(0.011) (0.012) 
Equib-member 
 
0.091* 0.048 
  
(0.051) (0.051) 
PSNP beneficiary household 
 
-0.041* -0.032 
  
(0.022) (0.022) 
Exposure to shocks  0.064*** 0.055** 
  
(0.024) (0.025) 
Regional dummy variables (4) No Yes Yes 
Constant 0.289*** 0.167*** 0.244*** 
 
(0.019) (0.055) (0.090) 
R-squared 0.010 0.100 0.213 
Number of observations  1,852 1,852 1,852 
Notes: Each column presents difference-in-differences estimations of equation (1) for household’s involvement in labor 
transactions. Except the first column, all estimations include four regional dummies corresponding to the main regions of 
Ethiopia. Estimates on the third column include 65 village (kebele)-level fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***, **, * indicates significance level at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. 
¥ Marginal effects are from a probit difference-in-differences estimation. 
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Table A5: Effect of iddir networks on credit access, difference-in-differences estimates, full model results 
Explanatory variables 
considered 
Credit from neighbors and friends 
Credit from informal lenders 
(Arata Abedari) 
(1) 
Without 
controls 
(2) 
With 
Controls 
(3) 
With 
village- 
fixed effect 
(4) 
Without 
controls 
(5) 
With 
controls 
(6) 
With 
village 
fixed effect 
β1 (treated) -0.004 -0.041* -0.063** 0.057*** 0.033** 0.053*** 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.030) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019) 
β2 (Post) -0.010 -0.016 -0.023 -0.003 -0.008 -0.004 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
β3 (treated*Post) 0.074** 0.068** 0.072** -0.046** -0.043** -0.043** 
 
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Probit DID:  0.074** 0.065** 0.075** -0.046** -0.034** -0.070*** 
Marginal effects¥ (0.034) (0.031) (0.033) (0.023) (0.020) (0.032) 
Age of household head  
 
0.001 0.001 
 
-0.000 -0.001* 
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Female household head  
 
0.002 0.013 
 
-0.009 -0.011 
  
(0.021) (0.021) 
 
(0.014) (0.013) 
Head attended schooling 
 
0.015 0.028 
 
0.015 0.011 
  
(0.017) (0.018) 
 
(0.011) (0.011) 
Number of adults 
 
0.005 0.007 
 
0.002 -0.002 
  
(0.007) (0.007) 
 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Number of oxen owned 
 
-0.025*** -0.029*** 
 
-0.013** -0.012* 
  
(0.009) (0.010) 
 
(0.006) (0.006) 
Land (in hectare) 
 
-0.010 -0.008 
 
0.000 0.002 
  
(0.008) (0.009) 
 
(0.005) (0.006) 
Equib-member 
 
0.055 0.044 
 
-0.036 -0.038 
  
(0.038) (0.039) 
 
(0.025) (0.025) 
PSNP beneficiary  
 
0.008 0.009 
 
0.018 0.015 
  
(0.016) (0.017) 
 
(0.011) (0.011) 
Exposure to shocks 
 
-0.009 0.013 
 
-0.000 -0.004 
  
(0.018) (0.019) 
 
(0.012) (0.012) 
Regional dummy variables 
(4) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Constant 0.129*** 0.026 -0.006 0.041*** 0.028 0.045 
 
(0.014) (0.040) (0.070) (0.009) (0.027) (0.044) 
R-squared 0.005 0.094 0.162 0.010 0.054 0.204 
No. of observations (N*2) 1,852 1,852 1,852 1,852 1,852 1,852 
Notes: Each column presents difference-in-differences estimations of equation (1) for household’s access to credit from 
different sources. Except the first and fourth columns, all estimations include four regional dummies corresponding to the 
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main regions of Ethiopia. Estimates on the third and sixth columns include 65 village (kebele)-level fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicates significance level at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. 
¥ Marginal effects are from a probit difference-in-differences estimation. 
38 
 
Table A6: Difference-in-differences estimates for households whose head was born in the village 
Explanatory variables 
considered 
Panel A: Land transactions 
Sharecropping-in Sharecropping-out 
(1) 
Without 
controls 
(2) 
With 
Controls 
(3) 
With 
village- 
fixed effect 
(4) 
Without 
controls 
(5) 
With 
controls 
(6) 
With 
village 
fixed effect 
β1 (treated) -0.027 -0.029 -0.055** -0.052* -0.022 -0.045 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.034) 
β2 (Post) -0.031* -0.046*** -0.043** -0.004 -0.010 -0.007 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
β3 (treated*Post) 0.101*** 0.104*** 0.099*** 0.068** 0.069** 0.064* 
 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) 
Constant  0.100*** 0.126*** 0.142** 0.166*** 0.254*** 0.173** 
 
(0.013) (0.038) (0.061) (0.016) (0.048) (0.079) 
 Panel B: Labor transactions    
 Labor-sharing – main season    
β1 (treated) -0.037 -0.070** -0.094**    
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.042)    
β2 (Post) 0.029 0.018 0.014    
 (0.027) (0.029) (0.029)    
β3 (treated*Post) 0.112** 0.110** 0.114***    
 
(0.044) (0.045) (0.044)    
Constant  0.299*** 0.123** 0.164*    
 
(0.021) (0.059) (0.098)    
 Panel C: Credit transactions 
 Credit from neighbors and friends Credit from informal lenders 
β1 (treated) 0.009 -0.034 -0.033 0.052*** 0.030* 0.056*** 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.032) (0.016) (0.017) (0.021) 
β2 (Post) -0.018 -0.026 -0.031 -0.010 -0.012 -0.011 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
β3 (treated*Post) 0.079** 0.068** 0.071** -0.037* -0.032 -0.031 
 
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Constant  0.119*** 0.036 0.016 0.045*** 0.065** 0.057 
 
(0.015) (0.043) (0.074) (0.010) (0.030) (0.049) 
No. of observations (N*2) 1,572 1,572 1,572 1,572 1,572 1,572 
Notes: Each column presents difference-in-differences estimations of equation (1) for household’s access to factor market 
transaction. . Except the first and fourth columns, all estimations include four regional dummies corresponding to the main 
regions of Ethiopia. Estimates on the third and sixth columns include 65 village (kebele)-level fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicates significance level at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. 
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